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Artificial Insemination-
No Longer a Quagmire
GEORGE P. SMITH, II*
With the recent decision in People v. Sorenson,l a significant
departure in ritualistic thinking in the area of domestic relations
was signaled when it was determined that if a consenting husband
allows an act of artificial insemination to be performed on his
wife, and the positive result of the act is a child, the husband
is-accordingly-liable for the child's support. No social stigma of
illegitimacy will be imprinted on the child and no question of
adultery can be raised as to the wife and donor or doctor.
In this particular case, the defendant husband, a domiciliary of
California, after being married to his wife for fifteen years, granted
his permission for her to be artificially inseminated. He, himself,
had been found sterile after seven years of marriage. A local
physician administered heterologous insemination, commonly
referred to as A.I.D.,2 by securing semen from a third party and
injecting it through a syringe into the defendant's reproductive
tract. The wife became pregnant as a consequence of the act and
gave birth to a male child.
The child's birth certificate listed the defendant as the father
*The author is assistant dean and assistant professor at the State University of New
York at Buffalo School of Law.
1. 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 437 P.2d 495 (1968).
2. The other way for effecting artificial insemination is referred to as homologous
insemination, or A.I.H. Here, a husband's semen is secured and injected into the wife.
This is generally necessitated because of a physiological (genital) obstruction by either of
the marriage partners. Legal problems are only created under acts of AI.D. which is the
more prevalent of the two methods.
According to one prominent authority, the number of childrerr born through
heterologous insemination or A.I.D. was in 1950 approximately 100,000 in the United
States. Today, the estimate is that over a quarter of a million such children live in the
States and perhaps another 100,000 in the other regions of the world. FINEGOLD,
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 58 (1964).
See generally, Holloway, Artificial Insemination: An Examination of the Legal
Aspects, 43 A.B.A.J. 1089 (1957).
2 Family Law Quarterly
and for nearly four years, a normal family relationship existed
with the defendant going so far as to represent to his friends that
he was in fact the father of the child.
In 1964, the Sorensons separated and Mrs. Sorensen requested
no support maintenance for the child. Due to an illness in 1966,
she was, however, forced to receive public assistance under the
California Aid to Needy Children Program. This present action was
subsequently maintained by the District Attorney alleging the
defendant's guilt under Section 270 of the California Penal Code
which imposes an obligation of support by the father under the
Needy Children Program.
The term, "father," must-the Court said-be construed broadly
under the statute presented here and, under no circumstances, be
tied to a rigid definition of a biologic or natural father. Rather, the
central consideration to be evaluated is whether the legal
relationship of father and child exists. 3 The legal presumption,
subject to rebuttal, is therefore maintained that if a child is born
to a woman who is or has been married either during the marriage
itself or within three days after its dissolution, the child in every
case will be presumed to be legitimately born of that marriage. 4
It is without purpose to categorize a child as either legitimate or
illegitimate because such a categorization does not resolve the
issue of the legal consequences flowing from a defendant's
participation in the child's existence. 5 The stigmatization of an
artificially conceived child as illegitimate serves no valid public
purpose.6
Sexual intercourse is, rather obviously, a primary element for
effecting or completing an act of adultery. 7 On first reading, one
would conclude that no serious problems would be raised in the
3. 437 P.2d 495, 498 (1968).
4. Id., at 497.
5. 437 P.2d 495, 500, 501 (1968).
6. Id., at 501.
Interestingly, since the beginning of time, woodland harbingers have-albeit
inadvertently-furthered the basic principles of artificial insemination through innocent
acts of cross-pollenation. Sound principles of animal husbandry also dictate cross
fertilization or selective breeding.
7. See generally, Note, Social and Legal Aspects of Human Artificial Insemination,
1965 WISC. L. REV. 859.
The New York Penal Law §255.17 (McKinney 1964) states: "A person is guilty of
adultery when he engages in sexual intercourse with another person at a time when he
has a living spouse, or the other has a living spouse."
Smith: Artificial Insemination 3
artificial insemination quagmire over this issue. Regrettably, this is
not the case. Since A.I.D. is not in fact the original fruit of a
lawful marriage, a child who is born of this process is quite simply
not the child of the impregnated female's lawful spouse. Since the
husband had no physical part in the birth of the child, his wife-so
the majority of past cases hold-has committed adultery.8
Even though a husband may have consented to A.I.D. for his
wife, he may subsequently claim the insemination as a basis for
divorce and his consent may not even be held to negate the
criminal act of adultery. 9
An Ontario court decided in 1921,10 that a woman had
committed adultery when she participated in A.i.D. because such
act "involves the possibility of introducing into the family of the
husband a false strain of blood."l 1 The whole emphasis for
determining adultery was shifted from physical penetration or
intercourse to any act which might introduce a false strain of
blood into the husband's family.
In deciding Doornbos v. Doornbos, 1 2 a Superior Court in Cook
County, Illinois, followed the Orford rationale and found that the
issue born as a consequence of A.I.D.-even where the lawful
husband consented to the procedure-is illegitimate and the very
act itself is adulterous.1 3
An English tribunal is L v. L14 concluded that although no issue
of adultery was present in a situation where A.I.H. was present
(homologous insemination using the husband's semen), since the
issue was not the product of a normal sexual act, it was
nevertheless illegitimate.1 s
Hoch v. Hochl 6 was the first case in the United States-although
never officially recorded and therefore of dubious precedental
value-which held A.I.D., even without the husband's consent, was
8. See Smith, Through a Test-Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the Law, 67
MICH. L. REV. 127 (1968); Hager, Artificial Insemination: Some Practical Considera-
tions for Effective Counseling, 39 N. CAR. L. REV. 217 (1961).
9. Id.
10. 49 ONT. L. R. 15, 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).
11. Id., at 22, 58 D.L.R. at 258.
12. 23 U.S.L. Week 2308 (Sup. Ct., Cook County, Illinois, December 13, 1954).
13. Id.
14. 1 All E.R. 141 (1949).
15. Id.
16. Time Magazine, February 26, 1945, p. 58.
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not adultery. In 1948, a New York Court followed suit and held a
child born of A.I.D. was legitimate. 1 7
1963 saw the New York Supreme Court dediding that a child
born of A.I.D. is illegitimate and the wife's act is adultery, even
though the husband gave his consent.1 8 The consent did, however,
make the husband liable for the child's support on an implied
contract theory.' 9
Adultery is committed solely for sexual gratification and is
completed by an act of physical intercourse. In A.I.D., there is no
physical gratification evidenced and there certainly is no physical
act of intercourse involved. The donor and the recipient never
consciously lay eyes upon one another. 2 0
Sorensen provides a glimmer of hope in judicial decision-making
regarding the pressing social need for legimitization of children
born of an A.I.D. union. 2 1 Justice McComb, speaking for a
unanimous Court, has added with equal clarity the modem
position regarding AI.D. as an act of adultery. "Since the doctor
may be a woman, or the husband himself may administer the
insemination by a syringe this is patently absurd; to consider it an
act of adultery with the donor who at the time of insemination
may be a thousand miles away or may even be dead is equally
absurd."2 2
The state legislatures are to be chided with the same severity as
the courts for flaunting the misunderstanding and, indeed,
ignorance of past generations at a modern, progressive age.
Although some legislative bodies have exhibited an awareness and
a certain degree of sensitivity to the artificial insemination
dilemma, only one-and then by implication-has sought to
legalize its use. 2 3
17. Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786,78 N.Y.S. 2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
18. Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S. 2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
19. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 41 Misc. 2d 886, 246 N.Y.S. 2d 835 (Sup. Ct.
1964) where an inference of illegitimacy with a corresponding implied promie of
support was found in a similar A.I.D. problem.
20. BOARDMAN,. NEW YORK FAMILY LAW WITH FORMS 483, 484 (Biskind
prep. 1966).
21. See notes 5 & 6, supm.
22. 437 P.2d 495, 501 (1968).
For a related problem precipitated by advancing artificial insemination techniques, see
Leach, Perpetuities in the Atomic Age: The Sperm Bank and the Fertile Decedent, 48
A.BAJ. 942 (1962).
23. Indiana House Bill 350 (1949); N.Y. Senate Bill 493 (1951); N.Y. Senate Bill 579
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Article 21 of the New York Health Code (1959),24 while
inferentially approving A.I.D., has not been interpreted as legal-
izing the process. It prescribes certain medical standards to be
followed for donors of semen and provides for the keeping of
records.
Oklahoma is the first state legislature to assume a definitive
posture within the area and to take the first bold step forward. 2 5
The statute quite simply provides children born through hetero-
logous artificial insemination (A.I.D.) will be recognized by the
law as natural born children of the husband and wife. Thus, it
appears that the inseminated wife is protected against subsequent
allegations of adultery which her consenting husband might raise
under this law. No protection is afforded such a wife who-on her
own initiative-experiments in A.I.D. without the consent of her
husband.
Assuming that a basic underlying purpose of marriage is directed
toward the achievement of the act of procreation, it would
logically hold that if this purpose has been frustrated, it would be
proper to resolve it by means of artificial insemination-assuming,
naturally, that the marriage partners wish to have the situation
remedied. Heterologous artificial insemination is morally and
ethically justifiable. It is not adulterous and the issue born by such
a union should be recognized as being legitimate.
It is encouraging to find-at last-one judicial body and one
legislature who have begun to forge a pathway in what, heretofore,
was a dense legal frontier land. The distressing fact is that if others
do not join in the work, progress will never be achieved within this
century which beckons to a brave new world. The issue is simple.
Common sense and moral decency 2 6 are the touchstones for
resolution of this current legal dilemma.
(1959); N.Y. Senate Bill 778 (1949); N.Y. Senate Bill 745 (1948); Virginia Senate Bill
199 (1948); Wisconsin Assembly Bill 407 (1949). All of these bills, if passed, would have
legitimized AI.D. children born with the consent of the impregnated women's husbands;
yet all were defeated.
24. Formerly, N.Y. SANITARY CODE §112.
25. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§551-53 (Supp. 1967).
26. See generally, FLETCHER, MORALS & MEDICINE (1947); Symposium, Morals,
Medicine and the Law, 31 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1157 (1956).
